We study own and rival risk in a dynamic duopoly with a homogeneous output good, stochastic industry demand, real options to expand or contract capacity, and potentially different adjustment costs across firms. In general, a competitor's options to adjust capacity reduce own-firm risk through a simple hedging channel. Intuitively, product market improvements increase the probability of near-term rival expansion, and negative demand shocks induce competitor contraction. As the rival moves closer to its expansion or contraction boundaries, these hedging effects become more important, and generally differ from the own-firm effects of real options. As a consequence, when a leader and a follower emerge in equilibrium, risk dynamics differ substantially from the simultaneous move benchmark. In leader-follower equilibria ownfirm and competitor required returns tend to move together through * Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino: Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia. Dockner: Vienna University of Economics and Business. We received helpful comments from Antonio Mello, Kristian Miltersen, and seminar participants at the Copenhagen School of Business, Duke University, HEC Lausanne, Mannheim University, Texas A&M, Washington University, the University of Amsterdam, the University of Bern, the University of Calgary, the University of Graz, the University of 1 contractions and oppositely during expansions. Thus, the common practice of using industry peer betas to proxy for own-firm risk should work well in certain environments, but not in others, providing testable new empirical predictions.
Introduction
A corporation's opportunities to expand, contract, or otherwise alter production can impact its risk and return dynamics, as observed by Berk, Green, and Naik (1998), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2004) , and subsequent authors. 1 In an industry setting, a firm's decisions may additionally affect the required returns of product market rivals, and vice versa. Understanding the distinct impacts of own and rival real options on firm risk can therefore be important to both finance research and practitice. For example, financial analysts often estimate the required return of a product or corporation using not only the historical risk of the firm, but also its industry rivals. 2 Hence, theory may help to shed light on practice by explaining how competitor real options impact own-firm risk as industry conditions change, and conversely how own-firm real options affect the required returns of rivals.
In this paper, we study own and rival risk in a dynamic duopoly with a homogeneous output good, stochastic industry demand, and real options to expand or contract capacity. We focus on cases where the two firms' adjustment costs are sufficiently asymmetric that a natural leader and follower arise in equilibrium, so that competitors exercise their options sequentially. The non-simultaneous exercise that characterizes a leader-follower equilibrium allows us to demonstrate how the risk dynamics of a firm and its rival may alternately move together or apart over time, depending on industry conditions and the corresponding changing importance of own and rival growth and contraction options. Because of these dynamics, in a leaderfollower equilibrium the joint evolution of required returns differs substantially from a simultaneous move benchmark.
For both expansions and contractions, we show that rival real options reduce own-firm risk due to a simple hedging channel. Consider first that the competitor possesses a growth option. In this case, any good news about the product market will be partially offset by the closer proximity of Zhang (2005) , and Novy-Marx (2008) . This literature is discussed in more detail below. 2 The widely used Ibbotson Beta Book provides estimates of beta based on a peer group that depends on industry classification, and the use of industry competitors to proxy for own-firm risk is discussed in finance textbooks such as Brealey and Myers (2001) , and Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe (1996).
1 the rival's expansion. Conversely, bad news is counterbalanced by a decline in the likelihood of competitor output growth over any fixed time horizon. Hence, all else equal rival growth options reduce own firm risk. Similarly, when the rival possesses a contraction option, industry demand shocks are partially offset by inversely related movements in the likelihood of nearterm rival asset sales, again reducing own firm risk. The magnitudes of the hedging effects created by rival real options change over time with industry conditions and the distance to the competitor's option exercise boundaries.
To develop intuition in the simplest case possible, we first consider an industry where one firm is a "strategic dummy" with permanently fixed output, while the second firm has a single option to irreversibly expand or contract its quantity supplied. At each instant, prices are determined by aggregate industry output and both firms receive a flow of profits. The firm possessing an option to adjust capacity has upper and lower bounds for expansion and contraction, and risk dynamics similar to those shown in prior literature focusing on monopolist exercise. Although the strategic dummy has no real options of its own, its valuation equations and risk nonetheless reflect the dynamic output policies of its rival. In particular, the risk of the strategic dummy decreases as its rival moves towards either its expansion or contraction boundary, and immediately jumps up to a constant when the rival exercises its option. Interestingly, the discontinuity in risk at the instant of competitor option exercise reflects the generic lack of smooth pasting when other players take discrete actions in a continuous-time game.
In the more general case where both firms may expand or contract, the own-firm and rival valuation equations and betas can possess up to four real options components. Whether on an expansion or a contraction path, the leader's real option tends to be more important for both own and rival valuation equations and risk, because the follower option is further out-of-the money. On an expansion path, the dynamics of leader and follower risk follow an interesting pattern. As the leader moves closer to exercise, her own risk increases due to growth option leverage, while the follower risk decreases due to the rival hedging effect. Immediately at the instant the leader exercises her growth option, the risks of the two firms jump oppositely by sufficient magnitudes such that the follower risk exceeds leader risk. Thus, on a path of increasing industry demand own-and rival-firm risk tend to move in opposite directions. By contrast, the own-firm and rival-firm effects of contraction options have the same sign, and in an environment of decreasing industry demand the leader and follower risks tend to move together. These theoretical results suggest that the commonly recommended practice of using competitor or industry betas to proxy for own-firm risk should work well in certain environments, but not in others, providing testable new empirical predictions.
Our paper builds on several areas of the literature. Berk, Green, and Naik (1998) and Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2004) Grenadier (2002) to analyze risk and return in a symmetric simultaneous-move oligopoly. 3 Our work differs from the prior finance literature by permitting asymmetric adjustment costs in an oligopoly setting, which leads to leader-follower risk dynamics in some cases, and simultaneous exercise in others. Under a leader-follower equilibrium characterized by sequential exercise, both own firm and rival options are important to valuations and have different implications for risk. Further, the relative importance of own-and rival-options shifts through time as industry conditions change, highlighting a new channel through which firms within the same industry may differ in their risk exposures.
Prior research in the real options literature analyzes equilibrium exercise of expansion or contraction opportunities in a duopoly setting, but does not investigate risk dynamics. 4 In general, simultaneous exercise of growth options may occur even when firms have asymmetric adjustment costs, provided assets in place exist (see, e.g., Pawlina and Kort, 2006) . Our framework emphasizes the importance of the product market demand elasticity in determining the boundary between simultaneous-exercise equilibrium and leader-follower equilibria. For high demand elasticities, simultaneous exercise can be supported for a large range of asymmetries in adjustment costs. By contrast, when demand elasticities are low, even arbitrarily small adjustment cost asymmetries can lead to leader-follower exercise as the unique equilibrium outcome. 5 For contraction options, no simultaneous-move equilibria exist.
In all leader-follower equilibria 6 for both expansions and contractions, the distance between leader and follower triggers remains bounded below even for arbitrarily small adjustment cost asymmetries, or in the case of identical firms when the leader is randomly chosen. Intuitively, the leader's action, whether expansion or contraction, strategically impacts the incentives of the follower to create a finite separation in their actions. Hence, non-simultaneous exercise can be an important feature of both expansions and contractions, even when firms are ex ante very similar or identical, and the risk dynamics that we demonstrate for leader-follower equilibria there- 5 For many combinations of low demand elasticities and large growth options, even perfectly symmetric firms cannot optimally exercise growth options simultaneously, and a randomly chosen leader arising from mixed strategies is the only possibility. Huisman and Kort (1999) and Boyer, Lassere, Mariotti, and Moreaux (2001) discuss mixed strategies in expansion games, which requires an extension of the strategy space beyond simple statedependent triggers following Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) . See also Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , who discuss a symmetric duopoly where firms have no assets in place, following Smets (1991) . Back and Paulson (2008) provide a more general discussion of equilibrium in continuous-time games where firms possess singular controls such as trigger decisions. 6 Our notion of a "leader-follower" equilibrium is synonymous with "non-simultaneous."
Several types of leader-follower equilibria are distinguished below and have been discussed in prior literature. In a "non-preemptive" equilibrium, the leader and follower use the trigger strategies that would arise if the follower were prohibited from acting first and the role of "leader" determined prior to the start of the game. In a "pre-emptive" equilibrium, the threat of action by the follower causes the leader to act earlier than she would if the rules of the game prohibited the follower from acting first. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, which is only possible if firms are symmetric, the leader is determined randomly.
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fore fill an important gap in the finance literature. Section 2 describes the general model. In Section 3, we analyze the simplest case where one firm is a strategic dummy, and show the risk-reducing effects of rival growth options. Section 4 presents the leader-follower equilibrium where firms with asymmetric costs may both expand or contract. Section 5 concludes.
The Asymmetric Duopoly Model
We present a model in which two strategically interacting firms compete in output levels in a homogeneous goods market, and have options to invest or disinvest in capacity.
Industry Demand, Production Technologies, and Capital Accumulation
Let Q 1 t and Q 2 t denote the output rates of firm one and firm two at instant t, and define the industry output rate Q t = Q 1 t + Q 2 t . The homogeneous good price is determined by the iso-elastic inverse demand curve
where 0 < γ < 1, and X t is an exogenous state variable that represents the level of industry-wide demand. The dynamics of X t are specified by
where dW t is the increment of a Wiener process, g is the constant drift, and σ 2 the constant variance. Firm i produces output at time t using installed capital K i t where i ∈ {1, 2}. Any capital level K i is associated with a maximum output level
For simplicity, capital levels take one of three discrete values: K i t ∈ {κ 0 , κ 1 , κ 2 }, where κ 0 < κ 1 < κ 2 . Costs of production for firm i at date t are given by the increasing function F i t = f K i t . This cost structure emphasizes operating leverage, since total expenditures depend only on the installed capital level K i , as with maintenance costs or other overhead related to plant size. Given the three possible capital levels, there are also three possible levels of fixed operating costs: F i t ∈ {f 0 , f 1 , f 2 }, where f 0 < f 1 < f 2 . To move from one capital state to another, the firm may incur costs or generate revenues, either from buying or selling the productive asset, or from pure adjustment costs. To capture this idea in a general way, we specify for each firm a matrix of discrete transition costs:
The instantaneously incurred lump-sum cost for firm i to move from capital level κ m to κ n is given by λ i mn . The only source of heterogeneity between firms in our model is the difference between transition costs, i.e., Λ 1 and Λ 2 need not be identical. We assume as an initial condition that at date zero, each firm is endowed with K i 0 = κ 1 units of capital. We finally define indicator variables D imn t that take the value one at the instant when firm i switches from capital level κ m to κ n , and zero elsewhere. 
Output, Investment Strategies, and Equilibrium
The economy described above is a dynamic game between firms 1 and 2. At each instant, the managers of the two firms choose output rates Q i t and make investment decisions D i t knowing the complete history of the game denoted by
, which is common to both managers.
We define the payoff to firm i as the present value of the expected discounted future cash flows. The cash flows at time t derive from revenues in excess of fixed costs π i t ≡ P t Q i t − F i t and from lumpy investment costs related to the decision D i t . We assume the absence of agency conflicts, so that manager i maximizes the value function
where M 0 = 1 and dM t = µ−r σ M t dW t represent the pricing kernel, 1 = [1, 1, 1], and * represents element-by-element multiplication.
Given the Markov structure of this environment, it is natural to restrict attention to Markov strategies. Manager i can then take actions Q i t and D i t that depend only on the most recently observed values of the payoff relevant state variables X t and
A pure strategy Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the game is a pair, i = 1, 2, of vector-valued functions Q i , D i (K t− , X t ). In an equilibrium strategy pair, each must maximize the value function (3) in every state (K t− , X t ), conditional on the equilibrium strategy of the rival.
It is straightforward to show that any MPE must have quantity choices equal to static Cournot equilibrium output levels. 7 Given our assumption that demand is sufficiently elastic (implied by γ > 0) and the absence of marginal costs, all firms produce at full capacity. Hence, any MPE strategy requires Q i t = Q i K i t . The instantaneous profit functions
are thus fully determined by the current capital levels K 1 t and K 2 t and the value of the state variable X t .
To aid future exposition, it is convenient to define the capital dependent revenue factors
where m, n ∈ {0, 1, 2} index the capital levels of firms 1 and 2, respectively. We can then conveniently write the profit function of each individual firm i
Given the simplification of the instantaneous output choices Q i t , we can henceforth focus attention on the dynamic game of option exercise involving the capital levels K i t and the investment decisions D i t . Any Markov strategy can be summarized by a set of exercise boundaries that for each player i and each capital state K t− specify regions of the state variable X t at which player i will change his capital level to a new state. We can use standard techniques of backward induction to derive MPE of the dynamic game.
Rival Growth Options and Risk
This section considers the simplest case of the general model developed in Section 2. Specifically, we assume that one rival is flexible, and begins with one option to either expand or contract, while the other rival is inflexible and has no ability to change its capital level. This scenario helps us to isolate the two sources of real option risk, own and rival, that can occur in a real options duopoly.
The flexible firm has risk that changes over time only because of its own real option and operating leverage. It's inflexible competitor influences total risk, but has no dynamic impact on the flexible firm risk loadings. As in the monopoly case explored in previous literature, the flexible firm has an own-option-leverage risk component but no independent source of dynamic industry risk. By contrast, the inflexible firm offers the polar opposite case. The inflexible firm has no own-option-leverage component in its risk loadings, but nonetheless, it is exposed to dynamic risk due to the investment decisions of its rival.
To achieve a specification where one firm is flexible and the other inflexible, we set the capital adjustment costs to
where S, I > 0. Firm 1, the flexible firm, thus begins at capital level κ 1 and has a single option to change capacity, either by expanding to κ 2 or contracting to κ 0 . If it expands, it pays the investment cost I and if it contracts it receives the salvage value S. Once firm 1 either expands or contracts, it has no further options to change capacity. Firm 2 begins at capital level κ 1 and has no real options. We now examine the exercise decision and valuation of the flexible firm.
Proposition 1:
The optimal policy of the flexible firm is to expand at X E > 0 and contract at X C < X E , where X C and X E solve the pair of nonlinear equations given in the Appendix. The value of the inflexible firm prior to option exercise is:
where V 1 A (K t , X t ) = R 1 11 X t /δ is the growing perpetuity value of assets in place assuming no future capacity adjustments by either firm,
t /r is the perpetuity value of fixed operating costs,
is the value of growth options, B 1 1 and B 1 2 are positive constants determined by the boundary conditions, and ν 1 > 1 and ν 2 < 0 are constants given in the Appendix.
As in standard real option models firm value is given by the value of the assets in place adjusted for fixed costs and the option value. We note that the real option has two components related to the growth option and contraction option respectively, but their values are not independent since the constants B 1 1 and B 1 2 can only be determined by jointly solving the value matching equations at the exercise boundaries. The positivity of the constants B 1 1 and B 1 2 reflects that ownership of an option must always be value-enhancing, and the signs of the roots ν 1 and ν 2 reflect that growth options increase with movements in the underlying asset while the opposite holds for contraction options.
The inflexible firm value consists only of its assets in place, but an externality is imposed by the rival real options.
Proposition 2. The value of firm 2, the inflexible firm, is entirely determined by the value of the assets in place net of the present value of fixed costs:
X t /δ is the growing perpetuity value of assets in place assuming no future adjustment to capacity by either firm,
t /r, is the perpetuity value of fixed operating costs,
t is the value externality imposed by competitor growth options, and the constants B 2 1 ≤ 0, B 2 2 ≥ 0 are determined by the value matching conditions at the rival exercise boundaries, as described in the Appendix.
The valuation externality imposed by competitor real options again has two components related to the rival growth option and contraction option respectively. The negative sign of B 2 1 reflects that rival growth options reduce value, while B 2 2 ≥ 0 follows from the value enhancing effect of competitor contractions. We note from Propositions 1 and 2 that contraction options impact own and rival-firm values with the same sign, whereas expansion options have opposite valuation impacts on a firm and its rivals. These valuation effects have implications for risk.
To determine dynamic loadings on the stochastic discount factor, we calculate the elasticity of firm value with respect to X t as described in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. The dynamic betas for the flexible and inflexible firm are:
prior to option exercise and
Consistent with the valuation equations, betas for both the flexible and inflexible firm consists of three parts. By assumption revenue beta is equal to 1, and the second component is operating leverage, which always increases risk. The final term for both firms arises from the flexible firm's real options. We note that although the structure of beta for both firms is similar, the economic interpretation is very different. The flexible firm's risk depends only on its own firm specific decisions, whereas the inflexible firm has no decisions to make and its risk is determined entirely by industry effects. Examining the flexible firm first, we note that since ν 1 > 1 and B 1 1 ≥ 0, its own risk rises due to its own option to expand. On the other hand, since ν 2 < 0 and and B 1 2 ≥ 0, risk is reduced by its option to contract. The inflexible firm dynamic loadings on the stochastic discount factor are determined by B 2 1 ≤ 0 and B 2 2 ≥ 0, implying that its risk decreases due to both the competitor growth option and the competitor expansion option. This simple example illustrates two important points, which we now discuss in more detail.
First, rival real options reduce risk. Intuitively, a competitor's investment decisions act as a natural hedge against variations in the exogenous state variable. Good news about demand going up will be partially offset by the bad news that the competitor is closer to expanding. Figure 1 gives a graphical presentation of this hedging argument. Before the follower exercises his growth option, industry output is given by the level Q 1 . Since both firms have to produce at full capacity, price fluctuates along the supply curve Q 1 . Consider now an increase in demand to the level Q 2 that induces the flexible firm to exercise her growth option. The corresponding increase in industry supply causes prices to increase less than to the level indicated by the old supply curve P * . The new price level is at the lower level P 2 instead of P * , and the dampening in profits corresponding to the increase in industry supply after a positive demand shock corresponds to the natural hedging effect caused by rival real options.
The second important implication of the simple example developed in this section is that growth options have an oppositely signed impact on ownfirm and rival risk, while contraction options affect both firms' risk in the same direction. These risk implications follow from the valuation impacts of own and rival real options discussed previously. Contraction options of both one's own firm and rivals create a hedge against adverse moves in underlying fundamentals. By contrast, own-firm expansion opportunities amplify risk, whereas rival expansion opportunities mitigate the potential for upside gain. Figure 2 shows the own and rival risk effects discussed above. For simplicity, we assume the inflexible firm has no operating leverage. In the figure, X C is the critical level of demand at which the flexible firm shrinks and X E is critical level at which the flexible firm expands. The diagram illustrates that rival real options reduce risk, and that real options can cause own and competitor risks to move together or in opposite directions. As demand increases and the growth option becomes more important, the flexible firm's risk increases while the inflexible firm's risk decreases. By contrast, after demand decreases and the contraction option is more valuable, own and rival firm risk tend to move together. The next section shows the robustness of these results when both firms possess growth options and exercise is strategic.
Equilibrium Exercise of Expansion Options
We analyze equilibrium in the case where both firms have only a single growth option. To achieve this specification within our general framework we set the capital adjustment costs to
where ρ ≥ 1 so that the costs of firm 1 are lower than the costs of firm 2.
We show below that in all Markov-perfect equilibria the low-cost firm exercises its expansion option at least as soon as the high-cost firm. Given this simplification, industry structure can be one of three potential phases: a juvenile industry where neither firm has exercised its growth option, an adolescent industry where the "leader" has exercised and the "follower" has not, and a mature industry where both firms have expanded. Figure 3 depicts the different industry stages.
We divide all possible equilibria into two primary classifications, "simultaneous" and "leader-follower." By this categorization, a leader-follower equilibrium is defined simply by the absence of simultaneous exercise. All three industry stages occur for a finite period of time with probability one in a leader-follower equilibrium, whereas in a simultaneous equilibrium the industry structure jumps immediately from juvenile to mature.
Following Pawlina and Kort (2006), 8 determining payoffs under different strategies proceeds by backward induction, and allows determination of the type of equilibrium. For example, assuming firm 1 as the leader and firm 2 as the follower, we first calculate the optimal exercise of firm 2 and then the optimal exercise of firm 1. We similarly calculate value functions and triggers with firm 2 as the leader and firm 1 as the follower. Finally, we calculate value functions and triggers where both firms exercise simultaneously.
To simplify discussion, in the remainder of this section we assume that the initial demand state X 0 is strictly less than the leader trigger level of firm 1, which ensures that the juvenile industry state occurs for a finite period of time in equilibrium. We then summarize the types of equilibrium that may occur.
Proposition 4. The MPE of the expansion game are characterized by:
1. Simultaneous Equilibrium: There exists a value ρ * * (γ, q 1 , q 2 , f 1 , f 2 , v 1 ) > 0 such that for all 1 ≤ ρ < ρ * * the unique MPE involves simultaneous exercise with a trigger that maximizes the low-cost firm's value. There exist no other simultaneous investment MPE. Hence if ρ * * < 1, no simultaneous exercise equilibria exist.
2. Non-Preemptive Leader-Follower Equilibrium: There exists a value ρ * (γ, q 1 , q 2 , f 1 , f 2 , v 1 ) > 1 such that for all ρ > max [ρ * , ρ * * ], the unique MPE results in the high-cost firm acting as the follower with trigger X 2 F and the low-cost firm acting as the leader with trigger X 1 LN < X 2 F , where the triggers given in the Appendix are identical to those obtained if the roles of leader and follower were predetermined prior to the beginning of the game, and the follower could not threaten to preempt the leader's investment.
Preemptive Leader-Follower
, the unique MPE results in the high-cost firm acting as the follower with trigger X 2 F and the low-cost firm acting as the leader with trigger X 1 LP < X 2 F , where the trigger of the leader X 1 LP ≤ X 1
LN
is determined as the indifference point of the high-cost firm between acting as a leader or a follower. Hence the threat of the high-cost firm to preemptively expand causes the low-cost firm to itself preemptively invest just at the instant when the high-cost firm's preemption threat becomes credible. The leader's expansion deters growth of the follower in the region between X 1 LP and X 2 F .
4. Random Leader-Follower Equilibrium: If ρ = 1 and ρ * * < 1, no pure strategy MPE is possible. To obtain a mixed strategy MPE requires expanding the strategy space as discussed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Huisman and Kort (1999) . 9 In the mixed strategy equilibrium the leader is randomly chosen at instant X 1 LP = X 2 LP , and the other firm becomes the follower exercising at
Equilibrium play in the expansion game can thus be categorized by the regions of the parameter space in which each equilibrium holds. To illustrate the proposition, we fix the parameter values σ = 0.2, q 1 = 2, q 2 = 10, f 1 = f 2 = 0, r = 0.05, δ = 0.03 and I = 500, and diagram in Figure 4 the equilibrium regions in the two-dimensional space of γ, related to the demand elasticity, and the relative cost difference ρ. For high levels of demand elasticity (low γ), the simultaneous equilibrium can be supported even when expansion cost asymmetries are large. By contrast when the demand elasticity is low (high γ), arbitrarily small positive cost asymmetries result in one of the pure strategy leader-follower equilibria holding. 10 The link between demand elasticity and the existence of the simultaneous exercise equilibrium relates to the impact of investment on the profits generated by assets in place, as suggested by Pawlina and Kort (2006) . When demand elasticity is low, expanding output has a small negative effect on asset-in-place value, and the benefit of waiting for simultaneous investment relative to acting as a leader is not as large. By contrast, when the demand elasticity is very high the value of waiting to invest simultaneously can be everywhere higher than the value of acting as a leader, and simultaneous investment can be supported.
Valuation in the pure-strategy leader-follower equilibria can now be summarized.
Proposition 5. In any pure-strategy leader-follower equilibrium, the leader's value function V 1 (K t , X t ) is given by
10 An interesting comparative static that does not appear in Figure 4 is that as the expansion level q2 increases (corresponding to an increase in the ratio of growth options to assets-in-place), the region corresponding to simultaneous investment shrinks.
and the follower's value function V 2 (K t , X t ) is equal to
where the optimal leader trigger is X 1 L ≡ X 1 LN for a non-preemptive equilibrium and X 1 L ≡ X 1 LP in a preemptive equilibrium.
Both firm values are composed of the growing perpetuity value of the assets in place assuming constant industry structure, the perpetuity value of the fixed costs, the own-firm option value, and the externality imposed by the rival option. Using the leader's non-preemptive trigger
, an alternative decomposition of the value functions can be derived:
where as before X 1 L ≡ X 1 LN applies for a non-preemptive equilibrium and X 1 L ≡ X 1 LP for a preemptive one, and
The leader's own growth option value is thus in a preemptive equilibrium proportional to a weighted sum of the two triggers X 1 LP and X 1 LN , whereas in a non-preemptive equilibrium the leader's growth option value depends only on the actual trigger X 1 L = X 1 LN . In both cases the own growth option value is guaranteed to be strictly positive. By contrast, the impact of rival growth options, or "value adjustments," is always negative due to the price-reducing effect of competitor expansion.
The valuation equations in a simultaneous-exercise equilibrium have a different appearance.
Proposition 6. In case of simultaneous exercise the value function of each firm V i (K t , X t ) is given by
with the expansion trigger
Firm value therefore appears to contain only the assets in place and an option component:
Hence, the distinguishing feature of the simultaneous exercise equilibrium is that the rival firm value adjustment is not apparent. Of course, both own-firm and rival effects are implicitly embedded within the growth option component of (4), but there is not a unique decomposition of the change in profits R i 22 − R 11 . For example, one possible decomposition for firm 1 is to designate R 1 22 −R 1 12 as the own growth option component and R 1 12 −R 1 11 as the rival effect. On the other hand, it is equally sensible to view R 1 22 − R 1 21 as the competitor effect and R 1 21 − R 1 11 as the own effect. Thus, due to simultaneous exercise the own and rival effects are not separately identified. However, we do note that in both possible decompositions the own effect is positive and the rival effect is negative.
To derive risk implications for all three different types of equilibria, we use similar notation as previously and write for i = 1, 2,
where V i O (K t , X t ) is the own-option component of value, and V i C (K t , X t ) is the rival-option component of value. 11 We then show Proposition 7. In all pure strategy equilibria, systematic firm risks for the follower and the leader are given by
for all industry states K t .
Systematic firm risk in a growing oligopolistic industry is thus driven by the a firm's operating leverage, its own growth options, and the risk reducing effects of rival growth options. We emphasize several important points regarding Proposition 7. First, the own growth option and rival growth option components of value enter additively into the second term in (5). Hence, the risk effects of own and rival growth options are identical when normalized by dollar values, which provides a remarkable simplification. Second, since ν 1 > 1, V i O (K t , X t ) > 0, and V i C (K t , X t ) < 0, own growth options always increase risk, and rival growth options reduce risk, independent of whether the equilibrium is simultaneous, pre-emptive, or non-preemptive.
Perhaps most importantly, only in the simultaneous equilibrium can we uniquely sign the sum V i O (K t , X t ) + V i C (K t , X t ) at all points in the state space. In particular, in a simultaneous exercise equilibrium this sum is guaranteed to be positive, and hence the cumulative effect of growth options is always to increase risk, consistent with the results in Aguerrevere (2009). By contrast, in a leader-follower equilibrium the cumulative effect of industry growth options
can generally not be uniquely signed, implying that growth options will alternately increase or decrease risk for a given firm at different points in the state space. Figure 5 displays the evolution of risk in a growing industry for all three different types of equilibria. In the four panels of the figure, we hold all parameters constant except the expansion cost asymmetry which is set to Moving from Panel A to B by decreasing the adjustment cost asymmetry ρ, the follower trigger moves forward closer to the leader trigger, but has no strategic impact on the leader decision of when to exercise, consistent with the nature of the non-preemptive equilibrium. However, in Panel C, the follower trigger moves close enough to the leader trigger that the follower would have an incentive to strategically preempt the leader prior to its nonpreemptive trigger. As a consequence, the leader must itself preempt the preemptive investment of the follower, by moving forward its trigger to X 1 LP . Finally, in Panel D the firms are sufficiently symmetric and the option value of waiting relative to acting as a leader sufficiently large that a simultaneous exercise equilibrium can be sustained.
The risk dynamics of the two firms in the leader-follower equilibria in Panels A-C differ markedly from the simultaneous exercise equilibrium in Panel D. For a leader-follower equilibrium, prior to the leader's exercise the leader's risk increases more steeply than the follower. Immediately upon the exercise of the leader growth option, the leader risk drops discretely and the follower risk jumps upwards, reversing the risk-ordering of the two firms. The two firms' risk loadings continue to move apart until the follower growth option is exercised, and no growth options remain. By contrast, under simultaneous exercise in Panel D, the risk of both firms increases equally and always is above one until the exercise trigger and then drops to the level of the cash flow beta.
The dynamics of risk in a leader-follower equilibrium therefore differ dramatically from the simultaneous exercise case. Proposition 4 states that the region of existence of the simultaneous equilibrium can be small depending on parameter values, and in many cases the simultaneous exercise equilibrium does not exist even for perfectly symmetric firms. These results imply that leader-follower equilibria are important and merit independent study. Our theoretical investigation shows that growth options have opposite effects on own firm and rival risk. Hence, the common practice of proxying for a firm's risk using industry peer betas may not be appropriate when growth options are an important component of firm values, and this theoretical implication can be tested in future empirical work.
Equilibrium Exercise of Contraction Options
We now assume that each firm has a single contraction option. Capital adjustment costs are specified by
where 0 < ρ ≤ 1 so that firm 1 has the high and firm 2 the low salvage value. This implies that firm 1 has an incentive to contract earlier. Our interest again lies in equilibrium play of the two rivals, and we focus on pure strategy equilibria only. In contrast to the case of expansion options, leader-follower exercise is the unique equilibrium, following Murto (2004) .
Proposition 8. For every 0 < ρ < 1 there exists a unique MPE of the contraction game in which the high salvage value firm acts as the leader with trigger X 1 C and the low salvage value firm acts as the follower with trigger X 2 C < X 1 C . If ρ = 1, there exist two pure strategy equilibria, one in which firm 1 acts as the leader and firm 2 as the follower, and in the other firm 2 acts as the leader and firm 1 as the follower. No equilibrium exists with positive probability of simultaneous contraction.
We note that preemption does not play a role in contractions because any rival reduction in output increases rather than reduces firm value. Hence, for symmetric firms the follower value exceeds the leader value.
We again assume both firms initially have capacity κ 1 . The leader contracts first at the demand trigger X 1 C , and the follower contracts at the trigger X 2 C < X 1 C . We then show:
and the followers value
with the contraction triggers X 1 C > X 2 C > 0 given in the Appendix.
Rewriting the contraction triggers and substituting into the value functions gives
The value functions are composed of the growing perpetuity value of assets net of fixed costs assuming a constant industry structure, the perpetuity value of fixed costs, and the own-firm and rival option effects. The own-firm contraction option corresponds to a put and has positive value, consistent with the product of ν 2 < 0 and [R 1 11 − R 1 01 ] < 0. The rival value adjustment also has a positive value, consistent with the increased market price induced by lower industry output.
As in the expansion case, the value functions can be written as:
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In contrast to expansion options, the rival effect for downsizing is positive
The risk dynamics of the two firms follows from the valuation equations.
Proposition 10. Systematic firm risks for both firms are
for all industry states K t , where ν 2 < 0 and
As in the case of expansion options, the own-firm and rival values of contractions appear additively in the numerator of the second term, again implying that own and competitor contraction options have the same risk implications when normalized by dollar values. In contrast to the case of expansion options the signs of V i O and V i C are always positive, which combined with ν 2 < 0 implies that contraction options, whether own or rival, always reduce risk. Figure 6 summarizes the risk dynamics in equilibrium for contraction options. In Panel A the degree of salvage value asymmetry is large with ρ = 0.1, and in the remaining three panels ρ progressively increases until reaching ρ = 0.99999. As ρ increases and the follower salvage value increases, its contraction trigger moves closer to the leader's. However, unlike in the expansion case, the increase in the follower trigger has no strategic impact on the leader's exercise, which always occurs at the same level of demand. We also note that even in the case where the salvage value is almost one, the difference in the leader and follower triggers is discrete. This is because the exit of the leader discretely raises the incentives of the follower to delay, so that the two triggers cannot occur arbitrarily close together.
The risk dynamics of the two firms in the contraction equilibrium differ, with each firm's risk dropping faster prior to its own capacity reduction. However, consistent with Proposition 10, both contraction options reduce risk for both firms, and the two firms risks always move in the same direction.
Conclusion
We study risk dynamics in a duopoly where firms possess real options to expand or contract capacity, with adjustment costs that potentially differ across firms. Prior research derives required returns in a variety of product market settings: monopoly, where own-firm real options and operating leverage impact returns Giammarino, 2004, 2006; Cooper 2006 ); perfect competition with identical firms, where only industry effects are present (Kogan, 2004) ; perfect competition with heterogeneous firms, where differences in cost structure drive expected returns (Zhang, 2005 ; Novy-Marx, 2008); and symmetric oligopoly, where both own and rival real options exist but their distinct impacts are not apparent due to simultaneous exercise (Aguerrevere, 2009 ). In the duopoly setting that we analyze, a variety of leader-follower equilibria exist in which a firm and its rival may exercise growth and contraction opportunities at separate times, allowing identification of the distinct risk impacts of own and competitor growth and contraction options. Non-simultaneous exercise can be the unique equilibrium outcome even when exogenous asymmetries are arbitrarily small or zero, and the risk dynamics that emerge in leader-follower equilibria differ substantially from the simultaneous trigger benchmarks that have been more commonly studied in the literature.
We find that a competitor's options to adjust capacity, whether expansion or contraction, reduce own-firm risk through a simple hedging channel. Intuitively, product market improvements increase the probability of near-term rival expansion, which provides an offsetting decrease in own-firm value. Conversely, negative demand shocks induce competitor contraction, helping to counterbalance the resulting decline in firm value. As a consequence of the risk-reducing effect of competitor real options, own and rival risk tend to move together in contractions, but in opposite directions during expansions.
Financial analysts commonly estimate the required return of a product or corporation using not only the historical risk of the firm, but also its industry rivals, as recommended by standard corporate finance textbooks. Our results suggest that using industry peer betas to proxy for own-firm risk may work well in certain environments, but not in others, in particular where growth options are an important component of firm value. Our study thus highlights the importance of rival real options as an independent source of firm risk dynamics, and provides new theoretical predictions that can be tested in future empirical work.
Appendix

A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition One
To derive the value of the flexible firm we assume that there exist two traded assets that can be used to hedge industry demand uncertainty. Let B t denote the price of a riskless bond with dynamics dB t = rB t dt where r > 0 is the constant riskless rate of interest, and let S t be the price of a risky asset. The price dynamics of the risky asset is given by
The risky asset S t and the industry demand shock X t are perfectly correlated. Hence, we can use the securities B t and S t , to construct a portfolio of the bond and the asset S t that perfectly replicates the industry shocks X t and derive its risk neutral measure. Demand dynamics under risk neutral measure are given by
where δ ≡ µ − g > 0. All the valuations in this paper are based on the risk neutral measure (6) . Under the risk neutral measure (6) the continuation value of the flexible firm needs to satisfy the valuation equation
with the boundary conditions
δ .
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The first two equations are the value matching conditions and specify that the option value at the critical boundaries are exactly equal to the present value of the incremental revenues net of adjustment costs. The last two equations are the smooth pasting conditions which are necessary for value maximization. This system of equations has no convenient analytical solution for X E and X C due to its nonlinearity. Using standard techniques the solution to equation (7) is given by
where B 1 1 and B 1 2 solve
and ν i ar the solutions to the characteristic equation
with roots given by
ν 1 > 1 is the positive root and ν 2 < 0 the negative one. For given positive values of X E and X C the solution of (8) satisfies B 1 1 , B 1 2 > 0. The values X E and X C can only be derived numerically. But it holds that X E > X C .
A.2 Proof of Proposition Two
Using the risk neutral dynamics (6) the continuation value of the inflexible firm has to satisfy the valuation equation
with two boundary conditions
for given trigger levels X E and X C . The boundary conditions are two value matching conditions. Solving the valuation equation using the value matching conditions results in the value of the flexible firm given by
where B 2 1 and B 2 2 are the solutions to the equations
For this equation system it is easy to show that B 1 2 < 0 and B 2 2 > 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition Three
Betas are given by
as described in Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) . Substituting firm values from Propositions 1 and 2 into this expression gives the result.
A.4 Proof of Proposition Four
We use the proof in Pawlina and Kort (2006) and adopt it to our investment game. 12 We first prove part a) of the proposition. Sequential exercise of growth options only occurs if firm 2, the follower, does not have an incentive to be the leader. Let V 2 F (K t , X t ) be the value function of firm 2, when it acts as the follower, and V 2 L (K t , X t ) be the value function when firm 2 acts as the leader. In the adolescent industry, when the leader already exercised its option the value function of the follower (firm 2) becomes
where X 2 E is the investment trigger when firm 2 acts as the follower. Now assume, instead, that firm 2 acts as the leader. The value function of firm 2 immediately after it invested as the leader becomes 
The value functions (10) and (11) satisfy the properties:
Moreover, the trigger level X 2 E is given by
and that of X
1,F
E is given by
Given our assumptions on the revenue function it follows that trigger (12) is greater or equal to (13) for ρ > 1. Firm 2 does not have an incentive to become the leader if and only if
F (X t , ρ) this holds true if and only if we find (X * , ρ * ) such that
It is straight forward to show that (14) and (15) are satisfied if and only if
The equations (16) and (14) identify ρ * . At the point (X * , ρ * ) the value functions of firm 2 acting as the follower is tangent to the value function of firm 2 acting as the leader. Hence, for all ρ ≥ ρ * the follower does not have an incentive to become the leader. Therefore for this set of parameter restrictions the equilibrium outcome is that firm 1 acts as the leader and firm 2 acts as the follower. This implies the sequential equilibrium as the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome. For ρ < ρ * firm 2 has an incentive to become the leader. This incentive exists for all values of X t in the interval [X 1 P , X
E ], where X 1 P is defined by
i.e., the value at which firm 2 is indifferent between being the leader or being the follower. If the leader's investment trigger satisfies X 1 E < X 1 P the follower value of firm 2 exceeds its leader value and firm 2 does not have an incentive to change its follower role. If, however, X 1 E > X 1 P the follower has an incentive to preempt the leader marginally which in turn causes the leader to choose X 1 P as the investment trigger. With this trigger firm 1 acts as the leader while it is optimal for firm 2 to act as the follower with the investment trigger X 2 E . In case ρ = 1 Boyer et al. (2007) demonstrate that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. b) In case both firms move simultaneously their value functions are given by
X t > X i S , with the symmetric expansion trigger given by
.
Since I 1 = I < ρI = I 2 the only candidate for a simultaneous equilibrium is trigger level X 1 S . For a simultaneous equilibrium to occur (i) the value of firm 1 being the leader has to be smaller than moving simultaneously with firm 2, 27 and (ii) firm 2 has to find it profitable to move simultaneously with firm 1 and not to wait and act as the follower. This requires that X 2 E < X 1 S . The proof of Proposition 3 in Pawlina and Kort (2006) demonstrates the existence of ρ * * > 1 for which both conditions (i) and (ii) hold and a simultaneous equilibrium exists.
A.5 Proof of Proposition Five
Has to be completed.
A.6 Proof of Proposition Six
A.7 Proof of Proposition Seven
Follows from the definition of the value function and beta.
A.8 Proof of Proposition Eight
We follow closely the argument used in the proof of Proposition 3.4. . We assume that now ρ < 1 so that the salvage value of firm 2 is strictly smaller than that of firm 1. This suggests that firm 2 is the follower in the contraction game, it is the firm that contracts later. The value function of firm 2 when it acts as the follower is given by
where X
2,F
C is the contraction trigger when firm 2 acts as the follower. Now assume, instead, that firm 2 acts as the leader. The value function of firm 2 at the time when it contracts as the leader becomes 
1,F C
is the trigger when firm 1 contracts as the follower and firm 2 acts as the leader. The two contraction triggers are given by 
and
Given our assumptions on the revenue function it follows that trigger (20) is strictly greater than trigger (19) for 0 < ρ < 1. From this property and the value functions (17) and (18) it can be shown that
holds for all X t . Hence, firm 2 never has an incentive to become the leader. Therefore sequential exercise of contraction options is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
A.9 Proof of Propositions Nine
The logic is the same as in Proposition 5 with the only change that because of the contraction the call option has to be changed to a put option with the corresponding terminal conditions.
A.10 Proof of Proposition Ten
Follows from the definition of beta and the value functions.
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